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COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY IN
CONTRACTS
PAULA WALTER*
As a basic premise of the common law, the Latin dictum pacta
sunt servanda commands that contracts should be performed ab-
solutely.' The sanctity of a contract, manifested in a party's abso-
lute liability for obligations assumed thereunder, is its recurring
refrain. This theme is continually echoed by the judiciary.'
Nonetheless, when an event or a contingency 3 occurs subse-
quent to contract formation but prior to its performance, rendering
that performance impracticable, performance is said to be excused
and the contract is discharged.4 Impracticability covers those sets
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baruch College, City University of New York; B.C.L.,
1973; L.L.B., 1974, McGill University.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 999 (5th ed. 1979).
2 As recently as 1985, that theme was echoed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Cook v. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1985). The court stated: "Con-
tracts are born of the need for certainty. They are the merchant's exchange of serendipity
for serenity, the deal upon which he can rely, for better or worse, months or years hence. A
contract is insurance against change." Id. at 1557.
3 A sampling of the case law indicates that the definition of "contingency" has been'
expanded to include recent economic and political events. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (war); Neal-Cooper Grain v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 503 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (foreign governmental regulation); American
Trading & Prod. Co. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972) (interrupted
trade routes-Suez Canal closure); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (same); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960)
(same); Peerless Casualty Co. v. Weymouth Gardens Inc., 215 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1954) (war);
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (substantial
increase in cost); Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa
1978) (oil energy crisis & embargo); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Li-
tig., 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (same); Lipsett Indus. v. Barth Smelting & Ref., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 406 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1975) (labor strikes);
Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (oil
energy crisis and embargo); Mineral Park Land Co. v Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458
(1916) (substantial increase in cost); Mansfield Propane Gas v. Folger Gas, 231 Ga. 868, 204
S.E.2d 625 (1974) (oil energy crisis and embargo); Mishara Constr. v. Transit-Mixed Con-
crete, 365 Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974) (labor strikes); International Paper Co. v. Rock-
efeller, 161 App. Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914) (substantial increase in cost).
4 See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.5-9.9 (1982); J. CALAmAm & J. PERLO, CoN-
TRACTS 476-515 (2d ed. 1977); Berman, Excuse for Non Performance in the Light of Con-
tract Practices in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1963); Birmingham, A Sec-
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of circumstances where performance is literally possible but is so
radically different from that contemplated by the parties as to be-
come impracticable.5 This doctrine is predicated on the theory that
the parties to a contract made their bargain with specific circum-
stances in mind, and that their basic assumptions about the world
in which the contract was to be performed were thereafter upset by
a contingency whose nonexistence was a basic assumption of the
contract.6 The upsetting event or unbargained-for contingency may
have occurred either because the parties did not anticipate the
possibility of its happening or if they did foreshadow its occur-
rence, they did not consider it probable. Alternatively, the parties
may deliberately have failed to specify what would happen in the
event of nonperformance. It then becomes reasonable for the
court to conclude that this contract was not intended by the par-
ties to apply to the new set of events and that performance should
be dispensed with or modified."
The judicial defense of impracticability was not merely an es-
cape mechanism from self-made contractual duties. It was a recog-
nition that, in commercial affairs, it was sometimes unwise and un-
reasonable to disregard economic disruptions and political
upheavals in the performance of business deals.9 The doctrine ap-
pears to accommodate and to balance the ongoing tension between
those changes a party negotiates by way of contract and those radi-
cal and unbargained-for changes which would render enforcement
of the contract unwise. The inevitable conclusion reached is that
the resulting contract could not have been contemplated to apply
to these new events. Thus, the doctrine of impracticability seeks to
ond Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligation
in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969).
See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, at 477-78.
6 See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 9.5, at 675-76.
' See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1331 (2d ed. 1962).
' See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911) (railroad's duty to
issue passes discharged when federal law prohibited common carriers from doing so); Cordes
v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581 (1878) (landlord's duty to rebuild wooden building discharged when
municipal ordinance prohibited erection of wooden buildings).
It should also be noted that, in the alternative, a court could order reformation of a
contract in the form of an upward price adjustment, awarding the promisor additional com-
pensation if he performed his contractual obligations when performance would otherwise
have been excused. See, e.g., Fattore Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm'n, 505 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1974) (limited to government contract area).
I See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 1332, at 365.
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balance the need to promote economic efficiency and the need to
honor the contractual intentions of the parties.
Today, section 2-61510 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"U.C.C." or the "Code") sets the minimum requirements for excus-
ing performance of contracts for the sale of goods. Section 261 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts" adopts the U.C.C. test of
impracticability for all other types of contracts. Both provisions re-
quire that the nonoccurrence of the contingency was a "basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made." The Code has made
no attempt to define or categorize those contingencies which enti-
tle a party to claim impracticability. In their favor, it may be said
that the drafters of the Code intentionally failed to name specific
instances of discharge so that the courts would not be hampered
by specificity.
Despite this legislative shift from the common law doctrine of
impossibility to a more liberal standard of impracticability, it can
be argued that the judiciary has failed to heed this liberalization.1 2
A survey reviewing the case law reveals that this new terminology
did not necessarily result in new thinking in the area. A single case,
1o U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). Section 2-615 provides:
ExCUSE BY FAILURE OF PRESUPPOSED CONDITIONS
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to
the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contin-
gency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his custom-
ers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as
well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any
manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-
delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated
quota thus made available for the buyer.
Id.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). Section 261 states: "Where, after
a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made." Id.
12 See Jennings, Commercial Impossibility-Does it Really Exist?, 2 WHITTIER L. REV.
241 (1980); Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of
the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 203 (1979).
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Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group's appeared as a beacon
on this judicially recalcitrant landscape. In this case, the court, for
the first time, rejected the legal maxim that the courts will not
make a contract for the parties.14 Instead, the court ordered a com-
plex scheme for price determination to replace the scheme outlined
in the contract. 15 Perhaps it was the court's recognition that the
allocation of risks, produced by the continued judicial adherence to
the common law standard of impossibility, was not satisfactory.16
That doctrine had introduced a related difficulty, where it was no
more satisfactory or equitable to hold a contract totally discharged
than to hold the contract to be fully enforceable. 7 An all-or-noth-
ing solution is, on occasion, no solution at all. The Alcoa court rec-
ognized that a compromise settlement was the proper and equita-
ble solution."8
The basic philosophical question raised by the Alcoa decision
was whether the courts should be permitted to rewrite the terms
set forth by the parties in the contract. On the one hand, there is
the recognition of the need to reform a contract when some exter-
nal unforeseen event has produced a major imbalance. On the
other hand, there is a legitimate fear that if the judiciary were to
appropriate to itself a mandate to rewrite contract terms, its effect
would be to impact negatively on the predictability and the useful-
ness or the raison d'etre of a contract. 9 Is the judiciary, as an in-
13 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
4 Id. at 79-80.
See id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78.
'8 Id.
's This decision divided both the courts and the legal scholars. Some legal scholars were
concerned that this attempt at judicial reformation was, at best, naive and, at worst, not
within the domain of the judiciary.
For scholarly reviews of the doctrine of impracticability, see generally Dawson, Judicial
Revision of Frustrated Contracts, 1982 JURID. REv. 86; Dawson, Judicial Review of Frus-
trated Contracts: the United States, 64 B.U.L. Rav. 1 (1984); Hawkland, The Energy Crisis
& Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 CoM. L.J. 75 (1974); Henszey, U.C.C.
Section 2-615-Does "Impracticability" mean "Impossibility", 10 U.C.C. L.J. 107 (1977);
Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual
Risks under U.C.C. Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REv. 545 (1976); Jennings, supra note 12; Pos-
ner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez
and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 419 (1969); Schmitt & Wollschlager, Section 2-615 "Commercial Impracticability".
Making the Impracticable Practicable, 81 CoM. L.J. 9 (1976); Sirriani, The Developing Law
of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: Part 1, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 30 (1981); Sommer,
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stitution, better able to do so? Would this mean the death knell of
"freedom of contract"? How do judges derive the power to impose
contract terms without the voluntary consent of the parties?
Would this mean that businessmen would be captive to judicial
discretion and therefore subject to a particular judge's values? Or,
should the parties be encouraged to reach compromise settlements
themselves?
The purpose of this Article is to examine and analyze the case
law since the enactment of section 2-615 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and to attempt to formulate clear guidelines in the area
of the law of impracticability. It is the further aim of this Article to
review the jurisprudence since the Alcoa decision in 1980, and to
analyze to what extent, if any, that beacon of equitable reform has
been followed or extinguished. The question to be answered is
whether such liberalization as permitted by the legislature has ac-
tually been achieved. Has the introduction of new terminology in
the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement been more than a seman-
tic change or is the doctrine still attached and wedded to the old
juristic concepts? Some commentators have reasoned that the judi-
cial decisions following the enactment of the Code simply pro-
longed the common law doctrine of impossibility rather than re-
placed it with a new standard.20
HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
The early common law tolerated no deviation from the obliga-
tions set forth in the terms of the contract. This view assumed that
when the parties contracted to perform, performance was to be en-
forced exactly as written,2 A promise was absolute and the prom-
isor was held accountable for his failure to perform, irrespective of
Commercial Impracticability-An Overview, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 521 (1975); Speziale, The
Turn of the Twentieth Century as the Dawn of Contract "Interpretation". Reflections in
Theories of Impossibility, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 555 (1978-79); Squillante & Congalton, Force
Majeure, 80 CoM. L.J. 4 (1975); Wallach, supra note 12; Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Excusing the
Impracticable, 60 B.U.L. REV. 575 (1980); Note, Commercial Impracticability and Intent in
U.C.C. Section 2-615: A Reconciliation, 9 CONN. L. REV. 266 (1977); Note, U.C.C. § 2-615:
Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse From Performance of Contract, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 297 (1974); Note, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C.
Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Con-
tractual Flexibility].
20 Jennings, supra note 12, at 242; Wallach, supra note 12, at 229; Note, Contractual
Flexibility, supra note 19, at 1033.
2, See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 9.5, at 670-71.
1987]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:225
the reason for such failure.22 A promise could be qualified, if at all,
only to the extent expressly stipulated by the promisor in his con-
tract. It was the promisor who assumed the risk of change. The
case most often cited for this rule of absolute liability is Paradine
v. Jane.2 The Paradine court stressed that the promisor was in a
better position to guard against unforeseen contingencies. 4
Because the rigid application of the doctrine of absolute liabil-
ity proved unworkable, the theory of the implied condition was de-
veloped by the courts. Taylor v. Caldwell25 is the seminal case es-
tablishing the common law doctrine of impossibility. The court in
Taylor held that, in the absence of an express term relieving either
party from performance under certain circumstances, an implied
condition may be found to excuse performance. The court stated:
"[I]n contracts in which the performance depends on the contin-
ued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that
the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the
person or thing shall excuse the performance. ' 26 The Taylor court,
in recognizing that the parties had not been sufficiently provident
22 Id.
23 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
21 Id. at 897. The court in Paradine stated: "[w]hen the party by his own contract
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstand-
ing any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his
contract." Id.
In Paradine, the landlord brought an action to recover unpaid rent. The tenant raised
as his defense that, because he had been dispossessed of the rented property by the invading
army of an enemy, he should be excused from the obligation to pay further rental payments
to the landlord. This defense was held to be insufficient at law because the promisor is made
to bear the risks of performance to which he obliged himself, especially since he is in a
position to guard against unforeseen contingencies.
Although there appears to be wide agreement among scholars that the rule of absolute
liability is derived from Paradine v. Jane, one scholar argues that three cases excusing per-
formance pre-date that case: Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1628), where the
subject matter of the contract of bailment was destroyed, Hyde v. Dean & Canons of Wind-
sor, 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1557), where a party to a personal services contract died, and
Abbott of Westminster v. Clerke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1536), where a supervening illegal-
ity due to a subsequent Act of Parliament excused performance. See Schlegel, supra note
19, at 422.
For a more recent statement of the rule of absolute liability, see Leavitt v. Dover, 67
N.H. 94, 95-96, 32 A. 156, 156 ("[h]aving voluntarily entered into an absolute contract, with-
out any qualification or exception . . . at a stipulated price .... he must abide by his
contract").
2" 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863). The contract in Taylor concerned the rental of a
music hall for a series of performances. The hall was destroyed by a fire of unknown origin,
without the fault of either of the contracting parties.
28 Id. at 314.
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to provide for relief, found that if the parties, at the time of con-
tracting, had cast their minds to the happening of the contingency,
the identical result would have been reached. In excusing perform-
ance, the court was merely executing the parties' intentions rather
than supplanting them and imposing a judicially derived settle-
ment. The promisor's absolute liability was not diminished, but
merely made subject to compliance with implied conditions. The
court did not, therefore, reject outright the theory of absolute lia-
bility, but instead reaffirmed it on its own terms.
The major criticism of the doctrine of implied conditions is its
lack of a logical foundation. Application of the doctrine involves
judicial speculation to determine what the parties would have pro-
vided had they anticipated the event in question. Is the judiciary
better equipped to divine the true intentions of the parties to the
contract? The implied terms could never be based on the actual
intention of the parties since no such intent had ever actually been
expressed. In short, this fiction can be thought of as a judicial tech-
nique for reaching a fair and just result for individual litigants
without undermining a basic tenet of the common law.
The Taylor rule, narrowly interpreted, stood for the piostulate
that the destruction of a specific thing excused performance. It re-
mained for the English coronation cases, most notably, Krell v.
Henry,2 s to expand this rule to encompass the nonhappening of an
event, and to introduce the legal theory of frustration of purpose
as a means of discharging contractual obligations without liability.
In Krell, rooms with a view of a processional route were leased for
the specific purpose of viewing the King's coronation procession.
When the coronation was cancelled due to the illness of the King,
the rental of the rooms remained physically possible even though
the underlying purpose of the lease contract had been destroyed.
The Krell court held that further performance, namely, the pay-
ment of the balance, was excused. 9
This formulation, although closely related to the doctrine of
impossibility, is conceptually different. Frustration of purpose is
predicated on the legal premise that the supervening event is so
radically and fundamentally different from the set of circum-
27 See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(doctrine of implied conditions is "fictional" and "unrealistic").
28 [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.); see also Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493 (C.A.);
McElroy & Williams, The Coronation Cases I, 4 MOD. L. REv. 241 (1941).
29 Krell, 2 K.B. at 754.
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stances contemplated by the contract that the contract cannot be
said to be "wide enough to apply to the new situation."30 Where
the parties' particular purpose has been frustrated by an unantici-
pated contingency, the parties are discharged from further per-
formance since the bargain has lost its value. This is the focus of
the English doctrine; whereas, the threshold question in American
jurisprudence is whether the parties intended to be bound despite
the fundamentally changed set of circumstances. The English the-
ory has not met with wide acceptance in American case law.3 1
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the test of imprac-
ticability was introduced in Mineral Park Land v. Howard32 as an-
other measure of determining impossibility, thus excusing per-
formance. The rule as stated in that case was that "a thing is
impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a
thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and
unreasonable cost. '33 Until this decision, the court had never ex-
cused the promisor's performance for hardship alone, or because a
contract had become unprofitable.34 Nevertheless, for the first
time, the court recognized that a contract which could not be per-
formed except at a prohibitive cost was no different from a con-
tract whose subject matter had been destroyed. Both types of con-
tracts were deemed impossible to perform. 5 In Mineral Park, the
promisor undertook to remove from the promisee's land all the
gravel and earth necessary to fulfill a contract with the public au-
thorities for the construction of a bridge. The promisor, having re-
moved approximately half of the amount necessary for the pro-
posed bridge, abandoned that site and obtained the remaining
gravel from another source. The promisee, in an action for dam-
ages, alleged that there remained sufficient gravel to complete the
contract.3 6 The promisor contended that, notwithstanding that
'o See Davis Contractors v. Fareham Urban Dist. Council, [1956] App. Cas. 696, 721.
31 See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); Crown Ice Machine Leasing
v. Sam Senter Farms, 174 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 180 So. 2d 656 (Fla.
1965); Perry v Champlain Oil, 101 N.H. 97, 134 A.2d 65 (1957); Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M.
175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
3'2 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460 (quoting 1 BEACH ON CONTRACTS § 216).
s Even after the Mineral Park case, the case law often refrains from excusing perform-
ance on the basis of hardship alone. See, e.g., Freidco v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F. Supp.
822 (D. Del. 1981). See also infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
' Mineral Park, 172 Cal. at 293, 156 P. at 460.
38 Id. at 290, 156 P. at 458.
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fact, his performance should be excused because the remaining
gravel was underwater and the cost of dredging and drying the un-
derwater gravel was approximately ten to twelve times the expense
of obtaining the same gravel above ground from another source.3 7
The court, ruling in favor of the promisor, stated that the defini-
tion of "available" gravel was only that gravel which could be ob-
tained in a practical and reasonable way." An expense ten to
twelve times that stipulated in the contract is more than just a
hardship; rather, such a prohibitive cost is sufficient to excuse the
promisor from liability for nonperformance.
Similarly, pre-Code cases have ordered upward adjustments of
the contract price precisely because performance of contractual ob-
ligations in the face of impossible odds justified reformation of the
contract terms. In City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles,39 the city
of Los Angeles and the adjacent city of Vernon had agreed, in a
series of four contracts, to transfer Vernon's sewage through the
sewage system of Los Angeles for discharge in a nearby bay.40
When a subsequent court order forced Los Angeles to abate the
nuisance it had thereby created and to build a disposal plant at a
cost of $41 million with $500,000 yearly operating expenses, Los
Angeles attempted to have the contract declared impracticable.41
The court held that the contract was not abrogated by this unfore-
seen event, and that Vernon and Los Angeles should continue the
- arrangement, but at a higher cost.42 Perhaps this was an instance
of a court-ordered adjustment because of the public interest in-
volved. In another pre-Code case, Dillon v. United States,43 a
court similarly ordered reformation of the contract to include resti-
tution to the promisor in the form of additional compensation for
extra effort and work completed.44 The court held that, had the
seller not performed, the supervening event or the crop failure was
of a kind to constitute impracticability and thereby excuse per-
"7 Id. at 291, 156 P. at 460.
38 Id. The court stated: "[Wihere the difference in cost is so great as here, and has the
effect, as found, of making performance impracticable, the situation is not different from
that of a total absence of earth and gravel." Id.
39 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841 (1955).
40 Id. at 711, 290 P.2d at 842.
41 Id. at 715, 290 P.2d at 846.
12 Id. at 717, 290 P.2d at 847-48.
13 156 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
11 Id. at 723.
19871
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formance."5 Dillon involved a contract to sell a specified quantity
of hay grown in Oklahoma to a federal calvary station. After the
government declared the state a disaster area due to a severe
blight, the seller imported the hay from a neighboring state in or-
der to fulfill his contractual obligations." The court awarded a
quantum meruit recovery in the amount of the increased cost.47
One could easily argue that this fell within the "failure of a source"
category rather than impracticability.
Thus, pre-Code case law allowed for a full discharge of a
promisor's contractual obligations, reformation of the contract, or
restitution of compensation to the promisor for additional benefits
conferred upon the promisee. Nonetheless, how does one deter-
mine, with any degree of exactitude, the point at which increased
cost crosses the boundary from the mere hardship stage to the pro-
hibitive stage? When does a difference in degree become a differ-
ence in kind?
MODERN LAW OF IMPRACTICABILITY
As the law gradually evolved from a rule of absolute liability
to the standard of impracticability, the primary focus of attention
turned from the fictional mental condition of the parties towards
the objective criterion of practicability. As previously mentioned,
the U.C.C.48 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts49 have
each adopted the objective test. The focal point of the present ap-
proach is to determine what risks, if any, each party to the agree-
ment had assumed. The court must then determine whether or not
the promisor had, either by the terms or the nature of the agree-
ment, assumed the risk of the occurrence of the contingency which
subsequently rendered performance impracticable. Viewed in
terms of the promisor's undertaking, if it is found that the prom-
isor had assumed such risk, the risk will be allocated to the prom-
isor and he will not be discharged from liability for nonperform-
ance. Conversely, where it does not appear either from the express
terms of the contract or from its surrounding circumstances that
11 Id. at 722. The court asserted that, had the seller not performed, the contract would
have been abrogated because of the blight. Id.
46 Id. at 721-22. The federal government declared Oklahoma a disaster area, but the
army's commanding officer insisted upon compliance with the contract terms. Id. at 720-21.
47 Id. at 723.
41 See supra note 10.
49 See supra note 11.
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the promisor assumed the risk of the contingency, the effect of the
Code is to shift the risk to the promisee. Comments to the Code
emphasize that the drafters intended the judiciary to look to the
commercial context in which a problem arose rather than to apply
a rule of law mechanically."
Both the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
made deliberate departures from the common law doctrine of im-
possibility by abandoning use of the term "impossibility" and re-
placing it with the term "impracticability." 51 Both provisions set
forth three conditions to be met before performance would be
deemed impracticable. First, there must be an occurrence of a con-
tingency. Secondly, the nonoccurrence of this contingency must
have been a basic assumption on which the contract was made.
Lastly, performance was rendered impracticable by this occur-
rence. The adoption of the "basic assumption" language is demon-
strative of the drafters' intention to steer away from the legal fic-
tion of the "implied term."
Another important theoretical change was the abandonment
of the foreseeability test of the First Restatement.5 2 Previously, the
risk of the contingency's happening had been judged by whether or
not the promisor had reason to anticipate the occurrence and
whether or not he was contributorily at fault for that event's hap-
pening. The question "did the promisor assume the risk of the
contingency" had become "did the promisor foresee the risk of the
contingency." Whether or not the tort law standard of foreseeabil-
ity applied, that of the reasonable man who in like circumstances
would have anticipated the supervening contingency, was unclear.
What is clear is that the foreseeability test demands that the par-
ties should have foreseen the occurrence. However, most times the
parties either did not foresee the risk of occurrence as probable or,
"' See U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 8 (1978); Hawkland, supra note 19, at 77. Hawk-
land's article quotes from the unpublished notes of Professor Karl Llewellyn, the U.C.C.
draftsman. In his unpublished notes, Professor Llewellyn emphasizes the attempt by the
Code to depart from the common law of impossibility and to replace it with a liberal ap-
proach to excuse contractual obligations:
[Tihe courts in the better cases have long sought to excuse the seller where his
performance had become impossible or unduly burdensome but the result- in any
given case remained uncertain. This Act, in addition to eliminating this element of
uncertainty, introduces a practical, commercial approach to the problem which
has not yet been generally recognized even by the sounder cases.
Hawkland, supra note 19, at 77.
I1 See supra notes 10 and 11.
52 RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932).
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because they were unable to agree as to its allocation, omitted it
from the contract altogether.
Another problem frequently associated with the foreseeability
test is the danger that hindsight provides a clear perspective which
would view the contingency as reasonably foreseeable after the
fact, even though very few might actually have envisioned its oc-
currence. Furthermore, the burden of proof necessary to adduce
that a particular event was not foreseeable is a difficult one to
discharge.
Certain inequities might arise where, in drafting a force
majeure clause, events of a general kind might have been provided
for, even though the particular contingency at issue was not fore-
seen. In such an event, the force majeure clause would operate to
excuse performance even though the court's object of inquiry
should have focused on whether that particular contingency was
foreseeable and not whether contingencies of that type were pro-
vided for. Some doubt has been introduced as to the consequences
of section 2-615 on force majeure clauses and whether that section
operates to abrogate the effect of deliberate efforts made by parties
to exculpate themselves from liability on the occurrence of a fore-
shadowed contingency. One commentator, after reviewing the
notes of Professor Karl Llewellyn, the draftsman of section 2-615,
suggests that its provisions do not apply to contradict the express
wishes of the parties or to impair their right to assume greater lia-
bility than that imposed by the Code." The provisions were
designed to apply to those parties who had not made such specific
provisions in their contract. This section would apply particularly
to the small businessman who had not hired skilled legal advisors
to assist in the drafting of such exculpatory provisions."
Although the word "foreseeable" does not appear within the
text of section 2-615, the official comment to this provision does
employ the term "unforeseen supervening circumstances." 55 Never-
theless, there appears to be a distinction drawn between "unfore-
seen" supervening contingencies and "foreseeable" events. Contin-
gencies that are unforeseen refer to actualities, that is, did the
53 See Hawkland, supra note 19, at 79.
See id. at 77.
" See U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 1 (1978). The comment states in pertinent part
that, "[tihis section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his
performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening cir-
cumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting." Id.
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parties actually foresee the particular contingency at the time of
contract, whereas the foreseeable events standard assumes a more
objective test. The question then becomes whether the ordinarily
prudent person, in the position of the promisor, could reasonably
have been expected to foresee or predict the happening of the con-
tingency. The "unforeseen" test would appear to impose a less
rigid requirement on the parties.
It should be noted that the Second Restatement's adoption of
the U.C.C. framework was entirely contrary to the First Restate-
ment's provisions in this area. The First Restatement had devoted
seventeen sections to the topic of impossibility and to the related
doctrine of frustration of purpose. 6 A distinction was also drawn
between objective impossibility and subjective impossibility with
the former excusing liability for nonperformance, whereas the lat-
ter did not.57
Additionally, the First Restatement listed with specificity
those contingencies which would operate to discharge the promisor
from his contractual duties.5" The Second Restatement and the
Code specifically reject this strategy. 9 The drafters believed that a
precise definition of the term impracticability ought not to be
given and intentionally adopted somewhat nebulous standards.
The law of excuse could be liberalized by granting the judiciary
more discretion to apply the rule as enunciated."0 An analysis of
the case law seems to indicate that the judiciary has not grasped
this great opportunity to grant the necessary relief.
CASE LAW
Since both the Code and the Restatement have specifically re-
jected the test of foreseeability as the only standard by which to
measure impracticability, several factors are now considered signif-
icant indices, such as increased cost, foreseeability, and assumption
of risk. Foreseeability alone does not ipso facto mean risk assump-
e RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 288, 454-69 (1932).
'7 Id. § 455. Comment to section 455 differentiates between "the thing cannot be done"
and "I cannot do it." See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 455 (1932) official comment.
Is See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 458, 461 (illegality); id. § 459
(death of promisor); id. § 459 (serious illness of promisor); id. § 460 (physical incapacity of
necessary party); id. § 461 (nonexistence of any other facts that the parties agreed to, either
expressly or impliedly must be in existence at the time of performance).
51 See supra notes 10 and 11.
60 See U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 8 (1978).
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tion. Nor does increased cost by itself indicate risk allocation.
Neither factor can be isolated. They are really intertwined and
each seeks to answer the same question: How did the contracting
parties choose to allocate risk, especially if there was no express
provision in the contract, on this matter? Are drastic price varia-
tions foreseeable, or phrased differently, which of the contracting
parties assumed the risk of a dramatic price swing? Whether the
court prefers to state its legal holding in terms of the element of
foreseeability, or in terms of the increased cost factor, the court is
really making a determination as to which facts or elements are
probative and dispositive of the parties' assumption of risk. None-
theless, upon analysis of the case law following the adoption of the
Code, it would appear that the courts have continued to employ
the old common law "foreseeability" test despite the lack of this
term in the text of section 2-615.
The first case to be adjudicated on the basis of section 2-615
was Transatlantic Finance Corp. v. United States." In that ac-
tion, the promisor, Transatlantic, had agreed to transport, at a
fixed cost, a full cargo of wheat from Texas to a port in Iran for the
United States government. The charter, which did not specify the
route to be taken, had been executed during the Mideast Crisis of
1956. One month following contract formation, the Egyptian gov-
ernment closed the Suez Canal to commercial traffic. A representa-
tive of Transatlantic contacted the United States Department of
Agriculture and requested instructions concerning disposition of
the cargo while simultaneously seeking an agreement for additional
payment to transport cargo by an alternate route, around the Cape
of Good Hope.6 2 Transatlantic was advised of the American gov-
ernment's expectation that the charter be performed according to
its terms and of the government's rejection of any claim for addi-
tional compensation.6
Transatlantic argued that the Suez Canal blockage constituted
a supervening contingency sufficient to render the contract impos-
sible to perform. 4 Transatlantic further contended that since it
had complied with the government's demand for delivery of the
" 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Technically, the transaction in question occurred prior
to the adoption of the Code, but the decision of Judge Skelly Wright set the tone, as well as
the criteria and pattern of analysis, for subsequent decisions on section 2-615 cases.
82 Id. at 314-15.
03 Id. at 315.
84 Id.
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cargo at an additional expense of approximately fifteen percent
over the originally projected price, a benefit was conferred upon
the government for which the government should pay under the
theory of quantum meruit6 5
The Transatlantic court introduced its holding by applauding
the new standard of the Code as a far more realistic theory than its
predecessor, the fictional implied term test. 6 The court next re-
peated those elements which must converge before a finding of im-
practicability could be made. 7 Although the charter in Transat-
lantic did not indicate the precise route, the court held that the
usual and customary route for such a voyage was via the Suez Ca-
nal, and that the closing of the Canal was an unexpected
contingency.6 8
Nonetheless, the crucial issue was whether or not Transatlan-
tic had assumed the risk of this supervening event. Transatlantic
had to adduce evidence which would prove affirmatively that the
risk of the contingency's occurrence had been allocated expressly
by the contract or could be implied from the nature and events
surrounding the contract.6 9 Knowledge by the parties that the Ca-
nal might become a danger zone was recognized by the court, but
the court's dilemma resided in its attempt to characterize the sig-
nificance of such knowledge. Judge Skelly Wright found that
"[f]oreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily
prove its allocation. '7 0 This finding was at variance with the earlier
common law position which held that an event that can be antici-
pated is an event that must be guarded against.71
05 Id. Compare City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 84
(1955) with Dillon v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (pre-Code cases allowing
quantum meruit recovery for claims against the government).
66 Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 315. To place the new test in context, the court stated:
"The doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully re-
sponsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the community's interest in having
contracts enforced according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness
of requiring performance." Id.
17 Id. The three factors considered were: (1) an unexpected contingency occurred; (2)
the unexpected occurrence must not have been allocated either by agreement or by custom;
and (3) that occurrence must have rendered performance commercially impracticable. Id.
11 Id. at 316.
69 Id. at 316-17.
70 Id. at 318.
71 For the first time, the court recognized that:
Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the possibilities of
which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot agree, often simply because
they are too busy. Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is proba-
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The court did not view the parties' implied expectation on the
use of the of the Suez Canal route as dispositive of the issue of
allocation to the promisee. Transatlantic was held to have assumed
this risk. The court, however, did not enumerate which facts in
particular led to this conclusion. Perhaps it was the fact that
Transatlantic voluntarily had agreed to proceed with delivery of
the cargo with full knowledge of the Canal's closure, without clear-
cut instructions from the American government as to an agreement
for additional compensation.72 However, in light of these vagaries,
it appears that Transatlantic had opted for the best choice availa-
ble to it at the time. To return to Texas with the unloaded cargo
would surely have served no one's purposes. Further, there did not
appear to be a requirement that delivery be made at a specified
date, nor did it appear that the cargo would be damaged by the
detour.
Judge Skelly Wright suggested that the party best able to ab-
sorb the risk was Transatlantic if only because, as the owner, it
was in the best position to purchase adequate insurance to cover
the contingency's occurrence.7 At most, the promisor had to as-
sume an increased expense, rendering the transaction less profita-
ble. Judge Skelly Wright affirmed that increased cost alone would
constitute impracticability only in the rarest of circumstances. "
His views would appear to be in congruence with the official com-
tive but does not necessarily establish an allocation of the risk of the contingency
which actually occurs.
Id.
I 2 Id. at 314-15. The owners, Transatlantic, never ceased their required performance,
nor did they argue that the contract had terminated. Logical thinking would find an internal
inconsistency between a claim for additional compensation and a claim for discharge of the
contract, both claims being based on the doctrine of impracticability.
71 Id. at 319. The court declared:
If anything, it is more reasonable to expect owner-operators of vessels to insure
against the hazards of war. They are in the best position to calculate the cost of
performance by alternative routes (and therefore to estimate the amount of insur-
ance required), and are undoubtedly sensitive to international troubles which
uniquely affect the demand for and cost of their services.
Id.
I 4 Id. The court reasoned:
While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and difficulty of per-
formance never constitute impracticability, to justify relief there must be more of
a variation between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available alter-
native than is present in this case, where the promisor can legitimately be pre-
sumed to have accepted some degree of abnormal risk, and where impracticability
is urged on the basis of added expense alone.
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ment to the Code. 7" Although the Transatlantic court spoke in the
new language of section 2-615, it seemingly reverted quickly to the
common law notion of impossibility. The court held that in order
for the Code to apply, the transaction has to become a nullity.76
Can a cogent argument not be made that this decision disregarded
the commercial realities of the case?
National Presto Industries v. United States," although it
predates the adoption of the Code's section on impracticability, is
frequently cited in subsequent Code-based decisions because of its
elaborate discussion of the notion of "assumption of risk." The
plaintiff, National Presto, brought an action for reformation of a
fixed price contract in which it sought additional compensation for
the extra work necessitated in order to fulfill its obligations under
a government contract s.7  The plaintiff did not seek to be excused
7 See U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 4 (1978). This comment states:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to
some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of performance.
Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is
exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are
intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a
contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of ma-
jor sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or
altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance,
is within the contemplation of this section.
Id. (citation omitted).
7' Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
court stated:
When performance of a contract is deemed impossible it is a nullity .... If the
performance rendered has value, recovery in quantum meruit for the entire per-
formance is proper. But here Transatlantic has collected its contract price, and
now seeks quantum meruit relief for the additional expense of the trip around the
Cape. If the contract is a nullity, Transatlantic's theory of relief should have been
quantum meruit for the entire trip, rather than only for the extra expense ....
There is no interest in casting the entire burden of commercial disaster on one
party in order to preserve the other's profit.
Id. at 320.
77 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
78 Id. at 108. The facts of the case were somewhat unique. The government had con-
tracted with National Presto for the production of 105-millimeter artillery shells using a
novel process which would eliminate the turning procedure necessary under the conven-
tional hot forge method, a system whereby heat had to be applied twice and any excess
amounts of steel would be removed by a turning process. Id. at 101. During the negotiation
stage preceding the formal contract there was considerable discussion about the need to
include a facilities schedule for plunge grinders, the necessary turning equipment. Despite
these oral discussions, there was no inclusion or mention of the plunge grinders or turning
equipment in the formal contract because the government refused to make such inclusion.
Id. at 101-02.
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from performance since it had met its contractual obligations. The
United States made the argument that a fixed price contract, by
its very nature, meant that the promisor was to assume any risks
associated with its performance, including the risk of price
increases."'
Two judicial comments serve to highlight the unique features
of the case. First, despite the government's insistence upon certain
technical specifications, Judge Davis held that both parties were
equally ignorant about the novel production method required
under the contract and that neither had any greater technical ex-
pertise than the other.80 Nonetheless, where government officials
prepare and insist on compliance with specifications, the Court of
Claims is more ready to find against the government.8 1 Such speci-
fications imported into the contract lend credence to the notion
that the government had represented, and may at times even be
held to warrant, that thorough adherence to these specifications
was the most cost efficient. Secondly, the court held that the gov-
ernment was not as interested in the end product, the artillery
shells, as it was in the perfection of the new manufacturing
process.82
One of the most significant aspects of the court's holding in
National Presto is that the fixed price nature of a contract does
not ipso facto mean an allocation of risk or an acceptance of the
entire loss by the promisor. Consideration must be given to all
facts surrounding the case.8 3 In addition, the National Presto court
specifically rejected the notion that the remedy of reformation was
not an appropriate one in these circumstances, and ordered that
the parties share the additional cost incurred.84
Foreseeability was the threshold issue in Mishara Construc-
79 See id. at 109.
80 Id. at 108.
81 See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (court allowed
quantum meruit recovery for plaintiff who followed governmental instructions).
82 See National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 110 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
:3 See id. at 111-12.
' See id. The court stated:
[I]t is equitable to reform the contract so that each side bears a share of the unex-
pected costs, instead of permitting the whole loss to remain with the party on
whom it chanced to light .... Where that arrangement has allocated the risk to
neither side, a judicial division is fair and equitable.
Id. at 112.
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tion v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp.85 The defendant in Mishara
had negotiated to supply the plaintiff with all its concrete require-
ments for a housing project. When a labor dispute disrupted work,
the defendant refused to make further deliveries under the con-
tract. After work resumed, and until the project's completion ap-
proximately two years later, a picket line was constantly main-
tained on the plaintiff's job site. The defendant never resumed
deliveries. Mishara was able to locate an alternate source of supply
for the balance of its concrete requirements, but at a higher cost.86
It sued the defendant for the additional cost it had incurred.
Transit-Mixed argued that it should be relieved of its contractual
obligations because of the existence of a picket line and the conse-
quent difficulties in making deliveries, which was a contingency,
the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made.87
In discussing the issue of impracticability, this court fused the
terminology of the English doctrine of frustration with the Ameri-
can common law foreseeability language. Were the unanticipated
circumstances such that performance of the promise would be "vi-
tally different from what should reasonably have been within the
contemplation of both parties when they entered into the con-
tract."88 Specifically, "[w]as the contingency which developed one
which the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as
a real possibility which could affect performance?""
The Mishara court suggested that a labor dispute would not
itself constitute an excuse for nonperformance but, within a certain
contextual framework, it could become grounds for excuse. Ulti-
mately, the court found that labeling a labor dispute as grounds
for excuse would depend upon the parties' knowledge of the "his-
tory of and prospects for" such disputes at the time of contracting
and the "severity of the effect of such disputes on the ability to
perform."90 The Mishara court concluded that the trend of con-
tract law appeared to be moving towards recognizing strikes as ex-
cuses for nonperformance.91 This conclusion would impel the infer-
365 Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974).
Id. at 124, 310 N.E.2d at 364.
17 See id. at 126-27, 310 N.E.2d at 366-67.
88 Id. at 129, 310 N.E.2d at 367 (quoting S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1931
(1938)).
9 Id.
Id. at 130, 310 N.E.2d at 368.
I" d.
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ence that the Mishara court would have excused performance in
contract law rather than strictly on the basis of section 2-615.
INCREASED COST AS A BASIS FOR EXCUSE
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Wegematic Corp.,92
announced contemporaneously with the Transatlantic case, held
in a similar fashion and interpreted the Code in the same way.
Wegematic had undertaken to deliver a computer with specified
capabilities to the Federal Reserve Board. Wegematic found, prior
to delivery but subsequent to contract formation, that it could
meet the Board's specifications, if at all, only at an additional cost
of between $1,000,000 and $1,500,000. The court rejected
Wegematic's impracticability argument, and once again affirmed
the proposition that impracticability is not to be determined solely
on the basis of increased costs. 3
In 1974, a New York Supreme Court decided the case of Ma-
ple Farms v. City School District of Elmira.94 The plaintiff, Maple
Farms, had agreed to supply milk to the defendant school district
at a fixed price. Six months later, the price of raw milk had in-
creased by 23 percent. 5 The plaintiff argued that its hardship
would be compounded and its contemplated losses tripled because
of similar fixed price contracts with other school districts. The sub-
stantial price increase in raw milk was occasioned primarily by the
Soviet-American agreement to sell large amounts of grain to Rus-
sia, which in turn created grain shortages in the United States.
The plaintiff argued that it could not have foreseen the execution
of this agreement. The Maple Farms court refused to release the
plaintiff from its contract terms. The court stated that the issues
raised by the facts of this case were analogous to those of Transat-
lantic, and thus it was persuaded to follow that decision.'
The Maple Farms court further stated that the contingen-
cies-the sale of wheat to Russia, poor harvests and general mar-
ket conditions-even if not actually foreseen by the plaintiff sup-
plier, could have been anticipated and should have been provided
for. The court charged the promisor with knowledge of "escalating
92 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
93 Id. at 677.
76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. Chemung County 1974).
" Id. at 1081, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
Id. at 1084-85, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (citing with approval Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
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inflation" after the "previous year's low."'97 If knowledge may be
imputed, and foreseeability is interchangeable with such imputed
knowledge, then consequently fixed price contracts must allocate
risk to the promisor.98 As to what extent increased cost should be
the basis for discharging a contract, the court stated that "[t]here
is no precise point, though such could conceivably be reached, at
which an increase in price of raw goods above the norm would be
so disproportionate to the risk assumed as to amount to 'impracti-
cability' in the commercial sense."99 Therefore, whether or not a
court would be justified in granting relief will depend, in large
part, upon the court's resolution of questions of fact regarding
the various levels of inflation. Courts will not allow a rela-
tively insignificant economic loss to constitute a valid excuse for
nonperformance.
A number of cases arose in the mid-to-late 1970's as a result of
the 1973 Mideast war, the resultant Arab oil embargo and forma-
tion of the OPEC cartel. In early 1975, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided, in Publicker Indus-
tries v. Union Carbide Corp.,100 that a loss in excess of $5.8 million
due to a 25 percent increase in the cost of ethylene did not render
the contract "impracticable" within the meaning of section 2-615.
The contract contained a price escalator clause. With only one year
remaining on a three year supply contract, Union Carbide in-
formed Publicker that it could not continue to supply ethanol at
the price originally agreed upon due to unforeseen and exorbitant
price increases engendered by the oil producing nations.10 The
Publicker court undertook to determine whether the sole purpose
of the price escalator clause, with the added ceiling provision, was
to allocate the risk to the promisor, Union Carbide. The very exis-
tence of a price ceiling was held to compel the conclusion that the
Id. at 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
" See id. The court reasoned:
Here the very purpose of the contract was to guard against fluctuation of price of
half pints of milk as a basis for the school budget. . . .It did not provide in the
contract any exculpatory clause to excuse it from performance in the event of a
substantial rise in the price of raw milk. On these facts the risk of a substantial or
abnormal increase in the price of raw milk can be allocated to the plaintiff.
Id.
99 Id. The court concluded by stating that on the facts of this case, the point of "im-
practicability" had not been reached. Id. at 1085-86, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
'00 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
101 Id. at 989-90.
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risk of substantial unforeseen price increases was to be borne solely
by the promisor. The court further stated that it was unaware of
any case in which a less than 100 percent cost increase was held
sufficient to excuse performance. 102 The court relied on the Trans-
atlantic and Maple Farms decisions as precedent despite the fact
that the price increases in those cases were on a much smaller
scale. The court also expressed doubt as to whether the rise in
Arab oil prices was a "contingency" within the meaning of section
2-615.1o3
Another federal district court, in Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil
Corp., °4 held that the market conditions created by the OPEC
cartel and the energy crisis did not compel the conclusion that this
was a "contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made." In June 1972, the par-
ties had entered into an agreement whereby Gulf Oil was to fur-
nish jet fuel to Eastern. The parties had agreed to provide a price
index clause which was to reflect changes in the price of crude oil.
The court found that since the parties recognized price increases to
be a "way of life," they must have intended that increases in crude
oil prices "be borne by Eastern in a direct proportional relation-
ship of crude oil cost per barrel to jet fuel cost per gallon."' 0 5 In
the aftermath of the Mideast war, a two-tier price control system
was imposed by the U.S. government with parallel prices fixed for
"old" and "new" oil, with May 1972 being the date frozen for old
oil. This kind of governmentally imposed price structure was un-
precedented, as was the 400 percent oil price increase unilaterally
imposed by OPEC between September 1973 and January 1974.106
As a result, Gulf alleged that the price of crude oil had risen with-
out a concomitant rise in the escalator indicator, thereby rendering
the contract commercially impracticable.
The court rejected Gulf's commercial impossibility defense,
finding that Gulf did not establish severe hardship as required by
section 2-615, since the energy crisis was "reasonably foreseeable at
the time the contract was executed.' 10 7 More significant, however,
102 Id. at 992.
103 Id. at 992-93.
104 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
105 Id. at 432-33. The court also held that the defendant Gulf had the burden of show-
ing the extent to which it had suffered, or would suffer, losses in performing the contract
and that this burden had not been sustained. Id. at 440-41.
101 Id. at 433-34.
107 Id. at 441. Perhaps, the admission by Gulf's foreign oil expert witness, that by 1969
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was the court's conclusion that once an event is characterized as a
foreseeable contingency, that event and all its effects, no matter
how improbable at the time of contracting, become lumped to-
gether as foreseeable. 08 By holding that the foreseeability test was
probative of the allocation of risk, the court dismissed outright the
impracticability argument despite its simultaneous finding that the
parties intended to pass the risk of a price increase from Gulf to
Eastern. 0 9 The court similarly disregarded Gulf's argument based
upon the imposition of a price control system because Gulf had
benefitted from its foreign oil import increases by a related price
increase per barrel. 01 Most startling was the court's pronounce-
ment that, since section 2-615 has its "roots in the common law
doctrine of frustration or impossibility,""' the restrictive concept
of foreseeability would be the basis of the decision.
The oil energy crisis had the further effect of precipitating a
greater demand for nuclear energy. In In re Westinghouse Electric
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,"2 Westinghouse had negoti-
ated, prior to the Mideast developments, a series of fixed price
contracts to supply uranium to various utilities. Subsequent devel-
opments in the energy field caused enormous price increases for
"the handwriting was on the wall," id. at 433, contributed to the court's failure to recognize
the energy crisis as a contingency contemplated by the Code. See also Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (defendant uranium supplier
not excused from performance, Arab oil embargo, emergence of OPEC cartel held to have
been foreseeable to some degree), rev'd for lack of jurisdiction, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980). See generally Duesenberg, Contract Impracticabil-
ity: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-615, 32 Bus. LAW. 1089 (1977); Hawkland, The Energy Cri-
sis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 Cot. L.J. 75 (1974); Hurst,
Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks
Under U.C.C. Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REv. 545 (1976) (articles dealing with price increases
for natural resources, especially oil).
"'l See Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 449, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
Judge King stated that, "[i]f a contingency is foreseeable, it and its consequences are taken
outside the scope of U.C.C. § 2-615, because the party disadvantaged by fruition of the
contingency might have protected himself in his contract." Id. (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 441. Cf. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (mutual mistake of fact is an unforeseeable risk and therefore the doctrine of
commercial impracticability was properly invoked). See infra notes 122-30 and accompany-
ing text.
110 Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 440-41. Gulf too benefited from its foreign oil
import increases by a price increase of approximately $3.88 to $4.43 per barrel compared
with profits of $0.88 to $0.92 respectively one year earlier. Because intra-company profit was
so extensive, Gulf did not find the court to be sympathetic to an argument of increased costs
and the concomitant economic hardship rendering performance impracticable.
Id. at 438.
405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
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uranium, resulting in Westinghouse's announcement that it could
not honor its obligations under these contracts. Estimates of pro-
jected losses began at a minimum figure of $2 billion and rose con-
siderably higher."'
The court lacked sympathy for Westinghouse's position and
rejected its impracticability defense on the grounds that Westing-
house was largely responsible for the short position it found itself
in. Having offered fixed price contracts to the utilities as an en-
couragement to employ nuclear energy, and having entered into
these contracts without a schedule for procuring the uranium,
Westinghouse was held to have contributed greatly to the tremen-
dous gap between supply and demand in the uranium market." 4
Although the full extent of the consequences engendered by the oil
crisis could not have been totally foreseen, this factor, in and of
itself, could not be isolated as dispositive of the case. Since West-
inghouse could not adequately prove that it had exhausted all its
possible alternatives to ensure an adequate supply of uranium,
Westinghouse could not abrogate its contracts with the utilities.
Despite these prior holdings that once an event is foreseeable
all of its consequences are similarly foreseeable, the District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa, in Iowa Electric Light & Power
Co. v. Atlas Corp., "5 strongly disagreed. A number of factors were
thought to have contributed to the price increase for uranium con-
centrate"' and Atlas' projected losses of $4 million. "I The court
in Iowa Electric specifically stated that a distinction should be
"I Id. at 317. In its announcement, Westinghouse declared itself to be seventy million
tons short of its contractual commitments to twenty-seven utilities. In its contracts with the
utilities, Westinghouse guaranteed delivery at fixed prices, ranging from $8.00 to $12.00 per
pound. The price of uranium started rising in 1974, so that by the date of its announcement
in September 1975, the market price of uranium had climbed to $40.00 per pound. By Janu-
ary 1975, Westinghouse had uranium commitments for about 60,000 tons and available ura-
nium of approximately 20,000 tons. See Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 5, col. 2.
114 Westinghouse, 405 F. Supp. at 318-19.
"5 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd for lack of jurisdiction, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
11I It was speculated that the oil energy crisis, stricter governmental regulations regard-
ing safety and the environment, increased market demand for the product, and internal
production factors contributed to the price increase. Id. at 134.
"11 Insignificant annual price increases, set by contract, paled in comparison to the un-
anticipated increase in the price of uranium concentrate (yellowcake) by 1978. At the time
of the lawsuit, Atlas was projecting a loss for fiscal years 1977 through 1979, not including
corporate overhead, interest and profits of $4,000,000. The buyer, Iowa Electric, brought an
action for specific performance to which the defendant-seller Atlas counterclaimed with a
suit for reformation of the contract, specifically for a price increase.
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drawn between a party's ability to foresee the happening of an
event and its ability to anticipate the myriad consequences of that
event. The court found that the severity of certain consequences
was of a kind to change the nature of that event in its totality.118
Notwithstanding this finding, the court decided that the con-
tract had to be enforced as written because the seller was unable to
show how much of the price increase was truly attributable to
outside factors and how much was a function of its own internal
decisions and actions.119 Presumably, internal actions are of a kind
that the seller could have controlled and therefore could have
guarded against by way of contract. Furthermore, where there is
evidence that the seller needed such a long term supply contract
for its own purposes to obtain corporate financing, it is clear that
the seller must have been aware of the possibility of monetary
losses. Such awareness was interpreted to mean that the seller as-
sumed the risk of an increase. 120
ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA v. EsSEx GROUP, INC.
In 1980, Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc. 2' was
decided by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania. In this case, the court for the first time rejected the legal
truism that the courts will not rewrite a contract for the parties.
Instead, the court ordered that a complex price scheme set by the
parties in their contract would be replaced entirely by a court-de-
termined price scheme. The facts of the case were not unusual. A
long term contract of sixteen years had been signed by the parties
wherein the promisor-seller, Alcoa, agreed to convert specified
amounts of alumina supplied by the buyer Essex and to redeliver
it to Essex as aluminum. The parties arrived at a price figure using
18 The court stated that, "many of those costs were not foreseen or considered likely to
occur or to be so substantial," id. at 132, and consequently, "[i]t would be unfair to expect
Atlas to have prophesied the magnitude of the increases complained of." Id. at 135.
119 In dicta, the court offered some thoughts on the judiciary's role. Although a contract
was conceded not to be a sacred document, the court noted that, "[v]oluntary attempts at
reaching equitable agreements and foregoing expensive litigation should be encouraged." Id.
at 136.
120 See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316
(J.P.M.L. 1975); see also Jennie-O-Foods v. United States, 580 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (doc-
trine of commercial impracticability may be utilized to avoid liability only when the prom-
isor has exhausted all its alternatives; that is, when all means of performance are commer-
cially senseless).
12 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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an indexing system structured by a prominent economist. Included
in this figure were three components with variable prices. One
composite was tied to an index of construction costs nationwide,
another to labor costs at the plant, and a third index to the whole-
sale prices for industrial commodities maintained by the United
States Department of Labor. This complicated price scheme
worked well until the non-labor costs at the seller's plant exceeded
the Labor Department index. Claiming that it would suffer losses
in excess of $75 million, Alcoa sought reformation of the contract
in the form of an upward price adjustment.122
The court noted that during the negotiations the buyer, Essex,
had insisted on a protective ceiling on the indexed price of Alcoa's
services. The question, therefore, was whether Alcoa, by omitting a
similar provision, had accepted the risk of "any and every devia-
tion of the selected index from its costs, no matter how great or
how highly improbable?""12 Judge Teitelbaum held that, even
though the parties obviously intended to limit their respective
risks, the seller alone could not be held to have assumed these
risks. The evidence of such intention was apparent in the complex
price formula, the 65 percent ceiling, the care and the expense of
the negotiation and drafting process, and in Essex' prior negotia-
tions with several other aluminum producers. The court suggested
that this omission could be interpreted to imply that the parties
deemed the risk to be too remote."2
The Alcoa court addressed the problem in terms of three basic
legal theories: mutual mistake, impracticability and frustration of
purpose-all of which "are qualified by the same notions of risk
assumption and allocation."' 25 Viewing the two notions as related,
the Alcoa court further discussed the situation in which parties are
conscious of the uncertainty of future values:
The proper question is not simply whether the parties to a con-
tract were conscious of uncertainty with respect to a vital fact,
but whether they believed that uncertainty was effectively limited
within a designated range [of probability] so that they would
deem outcomes beyond that range to be highly unlikely.12
"' Id. at 57-58.
123 Id. at 68.
24 Id. at 69.
121 Id. at 70.
126 Id.
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Under this reasoning, a loss of $75 million due to an indexing
miscalculation could not be within the range of predictability. Fur-
thermore, the court distinguished earlier Code decisions on the ba-
sis of the absolute extent of the loss and in the proportion of the
loss involved.
Nonetheless, it appears that the court was more concerned
with the remedies to be awarded to the successful litigant. The
court in Alcoa held that to let the chips fall where they may, would
cause unjust enrichment and defeat the aims of commerce.127 The
court recognized that to decree rescission in this instance would
result in a windfall gain for Alcoa and a deprivation of a long term
supply source for Essex. In lieu of the traditional all-or-nothing
approach, the court framed a remedy modifying the price term to
avoid an injustice. This equitable solution appears very much in
line with the official comment to section 2-615. 128
POST-ALCOA JURISPRUDENCE
It can easily be concluded that in the aftermath of Alcoa the
courts have, for the most part, rejected the philosophical and legal
implications of Alcoa. A careful survey and analysis of the case law
in the six years since that landmark decision shows that the judici-
ary is wary of assuming unto itself the right to intervene and re-
write contracts. In the year immediately following the Alcoa deci-
sion, several federal district court cases 129 were decided on the
1217 Id. at 79. The court stated that:
To decree rescission in this case would be to grant ALCOA a windfall gain in the
current aluminum market. It would at the same time deprive Essex of the assured
long term aluminum supply which it obtained under the contract and of the gains
it legitimately may enforce within the scope of the risk ALCOA bears under the
contract. A remedy which merely shifts the windfall gains and losses is neither
required nor permitted by Indiana law.
Id.
128 See U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 6 (1978). This comment states:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer
when the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under
the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good
faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions in the light
of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles in
furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
Id.
129 Freidco v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981) (court must ex-
amine the agreement of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their negotiations to
determine if they contemplated that the commercial risk involved would be borne by the
party claiming discharge, despite impracticability of performance. If so, that party is not
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basis of section 2-615.
In In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit-
igation: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,130 Westinghouse, after its sale to the Florida utility, agreed
in 1965 to supply the utility with its fueling needs. As part of the
deal, the utility alleged that Westinghouse had expressly agreed to
remove the irradiated or spent fuel from Florida's plant site.1 31
At this time, use of nuclear fuel as a form of energy was in its
embryonic stage; irradiated or spent fuel had never been commer-
cially reprocessed. It was only one year after negotiations had com-
menced that the first commercial reprocessing plant was licensed
in the United States.
In 1975, Westinghouse advised the utility that no such re-
moval would take place. By April 1977, any development of domes-
tic facilities for commercial reprocessing purposes was precluded
by Executive Order. The utility brought an action for specific per-
formance to compel Westinghouse to remove the spent fuel and
damages to compensate the utility for having to expand its storage
pits. In holding for the utility, the court stated that:
[R]isk allocation is determined by the totality of the circum-
stances, including the comparative abilities of the parties to make
informed judgments as to the extent of the risk; each party's in-
terest in avoiding the risk; and the extent to which that interest
was a factor in the negotiation of the contract .... [T]he foresee-
ability of the risk alone may well be sufficient for it to be re-
garded as implicitly assumed by the promisor.'32
excused and may be held liable for damages for nonperformance); In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981) (impracticability by reason of additional expense is not to
be determined by reference to loss, or by failure to profit, or from one particular contract
term in isolation, but rather, is to be judged from the perspective of the entire undertaking);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La.
1981) (loss must be especially severe and unreasonable before performance will be excused
based on increased cost).
130 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
" Id. at 443. At the time of the trial, Florida Light had stored 411 spent fuel assem-
blies and anticipated a total of 981 spent fuel assemblies to be generated over the life of the
contract, at a cost of $9,473,242. Id. at 448.
132 Id. at 456. Focusing on the totality of the circumstances of the case, the court stated,
"[k]nowing full well Florida's requirements, and knowing that reprocessing, not being avail-
able even then as a practical matter, was highly uncertain, Westinghouse agreed to a con-
tract term which in plain, unequivocal, unqualified language, required it to remove the spent
fuel from Florida's plants." Id. at 457 (emphasis omitted).
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The Florida Power court disagreed with the Alcoa case, but
attempted to reconcile the difference on the ground that Alcoa in-
volved an erroneous prediction as to the equivalence of values,
while Florida Power involved merely a mistake of judgment by
Westinghouse. The court reasoned that even though Westing-
house's performance would be more expensive, it would not give
Florida any unbargained-for benefit.133
In the same year, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, in Wabash Inc. v. Avnet Inc.,3 was similarly petitioned
to reform a contract for an upward price adjustment. The parties
had agreed to respectively purchase and sell IPM, a subsidiary of
Avnet, in compliance with a court order requiring Avnet's divesti-
ture of IPM. The agreement was required to be submitted to the
Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") for approval. The variable
originally chosen by the parties to determine the purchase price
was not approved by the FTC. Instead, the FTC approved the De-
partment of Commerce's GNP as the most appropriate index, since
in the past it had accurately reflected the company's sales. How-
ever, in 1980, due to the inflationary-recessionary cycle, the subsid-
iary's sales fell almost thirteen percent, while the GNP rose by fif-
teen percent. The plaintiff estimated that, if the disparity
continued, the sales price would be an additional $3 million.3 5
The court refused to reform the contract merely because it
contained a variable which was not consonant with the parties' ex-
pectations of economic events. Economic events which are unpre-
dictable to some extent cannot be the subject of an action to dis-
charge or to reform merely because the parties are disappointed
with the manner in which events unfolded. In assessing the impact
of Alcoa, the court in Wabash stated that "[u]nder the logical con-
sequences of that case, there would be no predictability or cer-
tainty for contracting parties who selected a future variable to
measure their contract liability. Whichever way the variable fluctu-
ated, the disappointed party would be free to assert frustrated ex-
pectations and seek relief via reformation." ' 6 This reasoning was
well-grounded in previous case law. 37
133 Id. at 458.
134 516 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. IM. 1981).
' ' Id. at 997.
Id. at 999, n.5.
137 As support for his decision, Judge Shadur quoted the 1978 New York decision of
George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 211, 219, 385 N.E.2d
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was
similarly called upon in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny
Ludlum Industries'8 to adjudicate a claim based upon section 2-
615 in light of the Alcoa decision. In 1974, Allegheny agreed to
supply condenser tubing at a fixed price to the utility for use at the
latter's nuclear power plant. Costs of raw materials, including elec-
trolytic nickel and low carbon ferrochrome, and the cost of labor
had increased markedly... from the contract date until May 1975,
prompting Allegheny to seek additional compensation. The utility
subsequently repudiated its contract with Allegheny, and, after re-
soliciting bids, found an alternate supplier. However, it sought to
recover the difference in cover price as well as expenses incurred in
the re-solicitation process. In its defense, Allegheny invoked sec-
tion 2-615 of the Code, and claimed that the contract should be
deemed discharged since the severe shortage of critical raw materi-
als and increased labor costs constituted an unexpected contin-
gency necessitating the price increase of condenser tubing. Had the
contract been performed as agreed, the projected losses to Alle-
gheny would have been $428,500, or a 38 percent increase over the
original contract price.
The court, in deciding in favor of the utility, stated that Alle-
gheny's absolute cost of performance did not increase to the extent
necessary to excuse performance under the doctrine of commercial
impracticability. The court went on to emphasize that "commercial
impracticability" could not be used to guarantee a trial to every
discontented buyer or seller. Such an application of law would con-
stitute an abuse of the doctrine of commercial impracticability.140
1062, 1066, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135, 139 (1978):
[FIreedom to contract would not long survive courts' ready remaking of contracts
that parties have agreed upon .... All the more so when a litigant seeks to invoke
the power of the court, not merely to sever the contractual relationship between
the parties, but, as here, to continue that relationship in a modified form.
Wabash, 516 F. Supp. at 999, n. 5.
's' 517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981).
' ' Id. at 1321. The factors had a 24% price increase, a 185% price increase and a 21%
price increase, respectively, from March of 1974 to May of 1975. Id. at 1321.
140 Id. at 1326. The court reasoned:
[T]he mere invocation of the term "commercial impracticability" is not a talisman
behind which a defaulting seller may hide and be guaranteed a trial .... Were
that the case, every seller or buyer caught in a burdensome position under a con-
tract would find it hard to resist the natural temptation to compel renegotiation of
unprofitable contracts by threatening to invoke a claim of commercial impractica-
bility, knowing that it would be assured of a trial on the merits and knowing that
even if it lost at trial, it would be required to do no more than to fulfill its obliga-
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The Louisiana Power court, in citing Alcoa, chose to distin-
guish that decision by the sheer magnitude of the losses that Alcoa
would have sustained had it been compelled to perform under the
original contract terms. The court found no comparable losses in
this instance. Additionally, the beneficiary, Louisiana, would not
have been the recipient of a "windfall profit" as was the buyer in
Alcoa.
In 1983, two decisions, one from the Ninth Circuit and the
other from the Third Circuit, reached the same conclusion-that
an argument of commercial impracticability or frustration should
not "provide a means of escape from a contract less profitable than
anticipated. ' 141
The first of these decisions, Waegemann v. Montgomery Ward
& Co.,1 42 involved commercial space that had been leased to Mont-
gomery Ward pursuant to an agreement which calculated the rent
according to the property taxes index. When the voters of the
State of California passed Proposition 13, which had resulted in a
significant reduction of real estate taxes, the lessor estimated that
they received only one-third of the current fair market rent and
claimed their lease was frustrated. The Ninth Circuit held that a
profit margin less than anticipated is limited to the category of a
bad bargain, but does not transcend into the area of extreme hard-
ship, meritorious of a commercial impracticability defense.143
In the Third Circuit decision, Camerlo v. Howard Johnson
Co., 44 the appellant Camerlo sought to have a lease declared void
and unenforceable. In 1960, Mrs. Camerlo leased twelve acres of
land for a ninety-nine year term, giving an option to renew forever,
to the respondents' predecessor in title. The rent was calculated on
a six percent return, on land valued at $200,000.14 When interest
rates soared dramatically, the appellant argued that the lease be-
came unconscionable and that performance should be excused on
the basis of impracticability. The court, in rejecting the appellant's
argument, cited the Alcoa decision as its reference to the law of
tion under the contract. Such a rule of law would constitute a misuse of the pro-
tections afforded by the doctrine of commercial impracticability.
Id. at 1326.
4 Waegemann v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 713 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1983). See also
Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co., 710 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1983).
142 713 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1983).
143 Id. at 454-55.
144 710 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1983).
141 Id. at 989.
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impracticability. However, the court did not discuss the case or its
legal implications. The Camerlo court simply affirmed the trial
court's decision that Alcoa's facts were clearly distinguishable and,
therefore, was not binding precedent. 146
Another case from the Third Circuit indicates that given the
proper circumstances, they may be receptive to the defense of
commercial impracticability. In Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal
& Coke Co., 47 the court was called upon to address the issue of
commercial impracticability and to delineate the proper scope of
an arbitration clause. The parties agreed in 1978 that the buyer,
Sharon Steel, would purchase 120,000 tons of coke annually for a
five year period. The price per ton was computed according to a
formula which included seven variables. 48 By January of 1983, the
depressed market conditions in the steel industry led to a reduc-
tion in the market price of coke to an amount well below that set
by the contract. At that point, the buyer informed the seller that,
due to the drastic economic changes, it considered itself relieved of
any further contractual obligations. 49
The court in Sharon Steel did not deal solely with the issue of
commercial impracticability since it was intertwined with an arbi-
tration issue. Instead, it compelled arbitration as specified in the
contract. The arbitration panel was to decide whether, in these cir-
cumstances, the exculpatory clause which exempted the buyer
from rendering "performance [which was] commercially impracti-
cable" applied to "any other cause beyond the buyer's reasonable
control."' 50 The court, however, summarized prior case law and
quoted the Alcoa decision specifically as dispositive of the issue
that a change in market prices could support a claim for commer-
cial impracticability. The tone of this decision, together with its
favorable assessment of the Alcoa case, lends credence to the view
that this court favors a liberal construction of section 2-615.
In contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, in Printing Industries Association v. International Printing
& Graphic Communications Union, Local 56,151 held that "[t]his
146 Id. at 992.
147 735 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1984).
118 Id. at 776. The seven variables were labor, royalties, equipment, trucking, power,
black lung expense, and "other." Id.
149 Id. at 777.
150 Id. at 776-77.
15' 584 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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[c]ourt is respectfully at odds with the reasoning and result in Al-
coa.''1 The plaintiff, a multi-employer bargaining association, si-
multaneously filed actions against four unions which represented
the printing industry employees in the Cleveland area. The plain-
tiff sought reformation of the cost of living allowance (the
"COLA") provisions contained in its contract.
The purpose of the COLA provisions was to keep the employ-
ees' salaries in consonance with any inflationary living cost in-
creases. The index chosen by the parties was the Cleveland Con-
sumer Price Index, as distinct from the National Consumer Price
Index. For reasons inherent to the housing situation in Cleveland,
the two indices diverged between 17.9 points and 21.5 points by
August 1982 and February 1983, respectively. The plaintiff-em-
ployer argued that this disparity granted the employees a pay in-
crease rather than simply a salary adjustment in accordance with
inflation rates. This court refused to reform the contracts on two
grounds. First, the court rejected the argument that the plaintiff's
proposition was supported by the Alcoa case and indicated that a
court's willingness to reform contracts would undermine the policy
of finality which is essential in contract law.153 The court sup-
ported this proposition by making mention of the Westinghouse
and Wabash cases, which also noted grave misgivings about ex-
tending the decision in Alcoa. Secondly, the court held that Alcoa
was distinguishable on its economic facts alone, since the disparity
of twenty points in the two indices in the present case would not
reach the level of loss sufficient for a claim of commercial impracti-
cability,"" as Alcoa did.
In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit dissected the theoretical under-
pinnings of the Alcoa decision without specifically mentioning it by
name. In Cook v. Deltona Corp.,155 the plaintiff-buyer had con-
tracted to purchase from the seller-defendant corporation, a real
estate lot which, at the date of the contract, was still undeveloped
and under water. To proceed with this landfill development, the
seller was obligated to obtain the necessary dredge and fill permits
112 Id at 998. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.: Flor-
ida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981); Wa-
bash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Printing Indus. Ass'n, 584 F. Supp. at 998.
' The court stated that Alcoa's projected $75,000,000 loss "constituted the level of loss
sufficient to make out a claim for commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose."
Id. at 1001.
155 753 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1985).
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from three separate authorities: the county, the state and the
Army Corps of Engineers. 58 After the contract had been executed
by the parties, the defendant was unable to deliver marketable ti-
tle to the lot because the Army Corps of Engineers failed to issue
the required permit. When the buyer, Cook, attempted to recover
his downpayment, the seller refused to make the refund. Upon liti-
gation of the dispute, the seller conceded nonperformance but
raised the impossibility defense and argued that the substantial
and unforeseeable increase in regulatory requirements for the issu-
ance of the required permits excused performance. The court re-
viewed the purpose of the doctrine of impracticability and con-
cluded that the contract is the exclusive medium for a party to
insure against change. The court stated:
[T]he most profitable approach to an impossibility claim is not to
pass on the relative difficulty caused by the supervening event,
but to ask whether that supervening event so radically altered the
world in which the parties were expected to fulfill their promises
that it is unwise to hold them to the bargain. 157
The court further decided that the key to determining how radical
that change had become is determining the foreseeability of the
supervening event. In contrast to the trend established by section
261 of the Second Restatement, which appears to soft-pedal the
requirement of foreseeability, Judge Hill held that the crux for res-
olution of any impracticability case turned on the sole criterion of
foreseeability.
Unlike the decision in Alcoa, which would permit the separa-
tion of the consequences from the actual contingency, making al-
lowance for radical consequences which might not be predictable,
this court held that, once an event could be anticipated, the fact
that the full scope of consequences could not be foreseen would
not operate to serve as an excuse. 15 8 This subtle distinction be-
tween anticipating an event and prophesying its myriad and multi-
" Id. at 1555-57. There was no prohibition on Deltona's ability to sell these lots, but
the corporation was on notice that it was mandatory to obtain these permits.
157 Id. at 1558.
"I See id. The court reasoned:
While it may be true that the extent of the ensuing regulations could not have
been foreseen by the company in 1971, it is equally true that the winds of change
were blowing and that [the company] was aware of that fact. This awareness dis-
ables [the company's] assertion that the increase in regulation changed basic as-
sumptions upon which the contract was founded.
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ple consequences, introduced by the Alcoa court, was totally re-
jected in this Eleventh Circuit decision. The strong language of
this decision illustrated the inclination of the court to eradicate
any liberalization of the affirmative defense of impracticability.
CONCLUSION
Case law on the doctrine of impracticability, decided since the
enactment of section 2-615 of the U.C.C., reveals an area of con-
tract law wrought with inactivity and stagnation. This section of
the Code, intended to serve as the "flexible adjustment machinery"
of Article 2, recognized the commercial senselessness of requiring
full performance of a contract where political and/or economic dis-
ruptions rendered such performance impracticable. In spite of the
intent of the draftsmen of section 2-615 to achieve innovation and
liberalization of the law, the judiciary, for the most part, shut the
door to further judicial interpretation and expansion.
In 1980, the Alcoa case deliberately departed from a line of
cases which had, until that point, held that Code impracticability
was very much like the common law doctrine of impossibility. Per-
haps it was the recognition by the court in Alcoa that the tradi-
tional alternatives of enforcement of a contract or its rescission
were really no solution since it was not in the best commercial in-
terest to place the burden of a contract, whose performance had
become burdensome, entirely on one party. Instead the court ad-
justed the contract in a manner which mandated that each party
absorb a portion of the loss.
Since that unique decision, there have been numerous cases
dealing with the question of whether to follow the precedent set by
Alcoa, or to distinguish that case on its unique facts. These cases
have chosen to isolate Alcoa to its facts because of the enormity of
its losses. It is worthy of remark that no case since Alcoa has had
comparable losses or concomitant windfall gains. At the district
court level, the decisions have elected to distinguish Alcoa. The
United States Court of Appeals has, on three separate occasions, 159
criticized the Alcoa decision as one in which the court has made a
contract for the parties. Only on one occasion has the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit been willing to consider the entire com-
'1- See Cook v. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1985); Waegemann v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 713 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1983); Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co., 710 F.2d
987 (3d Cir. 1983).
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mercial context within which the agreement was made.160 However,
even then, the court was unable to address the issue, since by the
terms of the original contract, the case was referred back to an
arbitration panel.
It is asserted that the importance of the Alcoa case lies in the
fact that it demonstrated the judiciary's potential power to provide
a more equitable solution to the traditional remedies heretofore
employed under section 2-615 of the Code. Post-Alcoa jurispru-
dence, however, has shown that the bench is largely unwilling to
develop the analysis or the methodology initiated by Alcoa, nor to
provide the remedy of reformation as a compromise solution to the
doctrine of impracticability.
16o See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1984).
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